In political science, legitimacy is the popular acceptance of a governing law or régime as an authority. Whereas “authority” denotes a specific position in an established government, the term “legitimacy” denotes a system of government — wherein “government” denotes “sphere of influence”. Political legitimacy is considered a basic condition for governing, without which, a government will suffer legislative deadlock(s) and collapse. In political systems where this is not the case, unpopular régimes survive because they are considered legitimate by a small, influential élite.1 John Locke The Enlightenment-era British social theoretician John Locke said that political legitimacy derives from popular explicit and implicit consent: “The argument of the [Second] Treatise is that the government is not legitimate unless it is carried on with the consent of the governed.”2 The German political philosopher Dolf Sternberger said, “Legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised, both with a consciousness on the government’s part that it has a right to govern, and with some recognition by the governed of that right.”3 The American political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset said that legitimacy also “involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society.”4 The American political theorist Robert A. Dahl explained legitimacy as a reservoir; so long as the water is at a given level, political stability is maintained, if it falls below the required level, political legitimacy is endangered.5

In moral philosophy, the term “legitimacy” often is positively interpreted as the normative status conferred by a governed people upon their governors’ institutions, offices, and actions, based upon the belief that their government's actions are appropriate uses of power by a legally constituted government. In law, “legitimacy” is distinguished from “legality” (see colour of law), to establish that a government action can be legal whilst not being legitimate, e.g. a police search without proper warrant; conversely, a government action can be legitimate without being legal, e.g. a pre-emptive war, a military junta. An example of such matters arises when legitimate institutions clash in a constitutional crisis. Conceptually, “legitimacy” also applies to apolitical authorities, e.g. the Marxist philosophic and politico-economic challenge of capitalism as form of social organization, and government. Contents 1 Types of legitimacy 1.1 Numinous legitimacy 1.2 Civil legitimacy 2 Sources of legitimacy 3 Legitimate forms of government 4 See also 5 References // Types of legitimacy Numinous legitimacy Coat of arms of the Holy See The divine king of Egypt: Horus as a falcon.

In a theocracy, government legitimacy derives from the spiritual authority of a god or a goddess. In Ancient Egypt (ca. 3150 BC) the legitimacy of the dominion of a Pharaoh (god–king) was theologically established by doctrine that posited the pharaoh as the Egyptian patron god Horus, son of Osiris. In the Roman Catholic Church, the priesthood derives its legitimacy from a divine source; the Church doctrines establish that the papacy based upon Jesus Christ’s designation of St. Peter as head of the earthly church, thus the sanctity and legitimacy of each pope. Civil legitimacy The political legitimacy of a civil government derives from agreement among the autonomous constituent institutions combined for the national common good; legitimate government office, as a public trust, is expressed via public elections. Sources of legitimacy Max Weber The German economist and sociologist Max Weber identified three sources of political legitimacy. Charismatic authority derived from the leader’s charisma, based upon the perception that he or she possesses supernatural attributes, e.g. a clan chieftain, a priestess, or an ayatollah. Traditional authority derived from tradition, wherein the governed populace accept that form of government as legitimate because of its longevity by customs, e.g. monarchy. Rational–legal authority derived from the popular perception that the government's power derives from established law and custom (a political constitution), e.g. representative democracy. Mattei Dogan

Moreover, like the British philosopher Thomas Hobbes, Weber thought that societies behave cyclically in governing themselves via different types of governmental legitimacy. Weber did not consider democracy necessary for legitimacy, because that condition could be established via codified law, custom, and principle, not via popular suffrage. He also observed that a society might decide to revert from legitimate government by rational–legal authority to charismatic government, e.g. Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler, Fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini, and fascist Spain under General Francisco Franco. The French political scientist Prof. Mattei Dogan presents a contemporary interpretation of Max Weber’s types of political legitimacy (traditional, charismatic, legal-rational) as insufficient to comprehend the complex relationships that constitute a legitimate political system in the twenty-first century.6 Prof. Dogan said that two of the types (traditional authority and charismatic authority) are obsolete; the example being the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979), based upon the Koranic interpretations of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Dogan proposes that traditional authority has disappeared in the Middle East, that rule-proving exceptions being Islamic Iran and Saudi Arabia. In Prof. Dogan’s opinion, the third Weberian type of political legitimacy, rational–legal authority, in the contemporary world has so evolved that its permutations no longer allow it to be limited as a type of legitimate authority. Legitimate forms of government This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2009)

Political legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, a philosophic construct by Walter Bryce Gallie (1912–98), presented to facilitate understanding of the different applications and interpretations of qualitative and evaluative concepts such as “Art”, “social justice”, et cetera, as used in aesthetics, political philosophy, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of religion.7 The term “essentially contested concepts” gives a name to a problematic situation that many people recognize: that in certain kinds of talk there is a variety of meanings employed for key terms in an argument, and there is a feeling that dogmatism (“My answer is right, and all others are wrong”), scepticism (“All answers are equally true or [false], everyone has a right to his own truth”), and eclecticism (“Each meaning gives a partial view, so the more meanings the better”) are none of them the appropriate attitude towards that variety of meanings.8 Constitutionalism — The modern political concept of constitutionalism establishes the law as supreme over the private will, by integrating nationalism, democracy, and limited government. The political legitimacy of constitutionalism derives from popular belief and acceptance that government action is legitimate for abiding the law codified in the political constitution. The political scientist Carl Joachim Friedrich said that constitutionalism, by dividing power among the organs of government, effectively restrains governmental action with codified law. (see checks and balances)9 Monarchy — In a monarchy, the governing legitimacy of the king or the queen derives from the popular perception (tradition and custom) that he or she is the rightful ruler, because of the divine right of kings. In the contemporary, twenty-first-century world, such political legitimacy is manifest in the absolute monarchy of the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia. Its variant, Constitutional monarchy, is based upon a combination of traditional authority and legal–rational authority, in order to maintain nationalist unity (one people) and democratic administration (a political constitution). Democracy — In a democracy, government legitimacy derives from the popular perception that government abides democratic principles in governing, and is legally accountable to its people.10 Totalitarianism — the single-party Communist and fascist states claimed governmental legitimacy for having won a revolution or for having won an election, and, thus, their actions are legitimate, authorised by “the people”. In the early twentieth century, Communist parties based their arguments upon the scientific nature of Marxism; whilst, in the 1930s, based upon traditional authority arguments, the German National Socialists and the Italian Fascists respectively claimed political legitimacy by philosophically denying the political legitimacy of elected liberal democratic governments. In the latter Weimar Republic (1918–33), Carl Schmitt, whose work as the “Crown Jurist of the Third Reich” promoted fascism and deconstructed liberal democracy, addressed the matter of political legitimacy in Legalitaet und Legitimitaet (Legality and Legitimacy, 1932) a treatise polemically asking that, if 51 per cent of parliamentary votes make for law and legality, then why do the remaining 49 of parliamentarians accept the majority’s decision?11 See also Constitutional legitimacy Mandate (politics) Rule of law Rule According to Higher Law References ^ Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (pp. 124–188). New Haven (Connecticut) and London: Yale University Press, 1971 ^ Ashcraft, Richard (ed.): John Locke: Critical Assessments (p. 524). London: Routledge, 1991 ^ Sternberger, Dolf: "Legitimacy" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (ed. D.L. Sills) Vol. 9 (p. 244). New York: Macmillan, 1968 ^ Lipset, Seymour Martin: Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (2nd ed.) (p. 64). London: Heinemann, 1983 ^ Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (pp. 124–188). New Haven (Connecticut) and London: Yale University Press, 1971 ^ Dogan, Mattei: "Conceptions of Legitimacy" in Encyclopedia of Government and Politics (2nd ed.) (ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan) Vol. 2 (pp. 116-219). London: Routledge, 2003 ^ Initially published as Gallie (1956a), then as Gallie (1964). ^ Garver (1978), p. 168. ^ Charlton, Roger: Political Realities: Comparative Government (p. 23). London: Longman, 1986 ^ Charlton, Roger: Political Realities: Comparative Government (p. 23). London: Longman, 1986 ^ Schmitt, Carl: Legality and Legitimacy (Jeffrey Seitzer trans.). Durham (North Carolina): Duke University Press, 2004